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<We identify the destination’s key features: product sophistication and price coordination.
<We model the optimal development strategy of the tourism destination.
<We state a Coordination theorem and a Love for Variety theorem.
<We classify destinations based on type of coordination and type of resources.
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The paper models the optimal development strategy of a tourism destination by identifying and
analyzing two key economic features: i) the long-term choice of whether to invest in the enhancing of
natural and/or cultural resources (which act as common goods in the destination) or to increase the
degree of sophistication of the tourism product (here intended as the variety of complementary services
to accommodation that are demanded by tourists); ii) the short-term choice of whether or not to
implement price coordination among local ﬁrms, a problem stemming from the anticommon nature of
the tourism product. We build a two-stage model for the tourism destination, thus identifying the
optimal degree of sophistication of the tourism product and the optimal institutional arrangement in
terms of coordination. This approach helps shed light on the rationale underlying the development path
taken by different destinations, thus overcoming some of the limits of existing literature and providing a
simple taxonomy for the observed diversity of real-world destinations. Accordingly, we provide a clas-
siﬁcation of destinations based on the type of coordination and on whether the primary resource is
natural, cultural or organizational.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The literature in tourism studies has established the tourism
destination (TD) as one of its key concepts. Indeed, many papers
pivot around the organization, management, development, and
sustainability of tourism destinations. From the researcher’s
perspective, the TD embodies all the speciﬁc and problematic fea-
tures of tourism, such as its systemic nature, in which “space” plays
a fundamental role (Leiper, 1990). In fact, tourism supply meets
demand in the destination; environmental and cultural resources,
attractions and the hospitality industry are all located in the
destination; the demand for tourism is revealed in the destination.
In other words, the TD is the conceptual link between the
complexity of the sector, the complementarity and substitutability
of the many goods and services of which the tourism product
consists, and the supply of available local resources. Several
different deﬁnitions exist for the TD, ranging from management
studies, where it is mainly interpreted as a product, to tourism
geography where the destination is intended as the offer of the
territory. In this paper we consider the destination from the eco-
nomics perspective, as a kind of (meta) economic agent: a territo-
rial system supplying at least one tourism product able to satisfy
the complex requirements of the demand for tourism (Candela &
Figini, 2012). The term “tourism product” deﬁnes what is
commonly known as “a holiday”, or what tourism sociology calls
the tourist’s experience.
But, where is the economics of destinations mentioned in the
literature about tourism? Although its speciﬁc features are indeed
discussed by other disciplines, such as geography, management,
marketing and organizational studies, study of the TD from the
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economics perspective is in its infancy. Indeed, neither the micro
nor the macroeconomic literature currently available helps us fully
grasp the concept. In fact, most literature considers the destination
as a mere framework, nothing more than the abstract concept of
“market”, in which to analyze the micro-behavior of speciﬁc in-
dustries, such as the structure of the hotel industry in a speciﬁc
destination, or tourists (e.g. the determinants of the demand for
tourism in a given destination). Similarly, macroeconomic literature
often identiﬁes the destination with an entire country, in a
framework where, in order to attain the maximum growth rate, the
economy can specialize in tourism and no attention is paid to what
happens within the destination itself. The many theoretical and
empirical works testing the validity of the Tourism-Led-Growth
hypothesis or whether tourism can be considered as an indepen-
dent factor of economic growth (Brau, Lanza, & Pigliaru, 2007;
Figini & Vici, 2010; Lanza & Pigliaru, 1995, 2000; Sequeira & Macas
Nunes, 2008) can be recalled here. However, both micro and
macroeconomic literature only scratches the surface of what the
speciﬁc and distinctive economic problem of the TD actually is.
The most highly regarded economic model speciﬁcally built for
destinations is probably the Tourism Area Life-Cycle (TALC) model
(Butler, 1980), a well-known application of the product life-cycle
theory. Together with Plog (1974), the psychographic representa-
tionof the interrelationbetween typesof tourists and theevolutionof
the destination, the TALCmodel is still today themainpillar onwhich
the economic analysis of the TD is based (Butler, 2006). Regardless of
its popularity, however, the TALC model has signiﬁcant limitations.
Firstly, it is a purely descriptive model, with very little explanatory
power; secondly, it is a deterministic model, and the TD is bound to
pass through the subsequent phases of evolution given that the
model is unable to fully take different trajectories into account.
Research into the economics of tourism has only recently started
investigating the TD more closely, and two interesting strands of
literature can be identiﬁed. The ﬁrst provides a more theoretically
sound basis to the TALC model. In particular, Giannoni and
Maupertuis (2007) analyze the dynamics between the pattern of
investment in tourism infrastructures, policy choices and envi-
ronmental quality, thereby generating cyclical paths in the number
of tourists hosted (from the perspective of consumption waves
theory, see also Swann, 2010); similarly, Lozano, Gomez, and Rey-
Maquieira (2008) build a theoretical model whose dynamics are
consistent with TALC; ﬁnally, Cerina (2007) investigates the rela-
tionship between growth dynamics and environmental sustain-
ability in a model where tourism resources are interpreted as
common goods, thus providing a theoretical basis for the concept of
sustainable tourism. Nevertheless, all these models share the same
caveat as they are mainly macroeconomic growth models where
the TD completely overlaps with the economic system, i.e. the
country specializes entirely in tourism, and where there are no
insights into what happens within the TD. In other words, the
models have no micro-foundation.
A second strand of literature tries to take speciﬁc organizational
features and the economic characteristics of the destination into
account. In this line of research, the ﬁrst attempts to build a
comprehensive economic model for the TD were made by Huybers
and Bennett (2003), Papatheodorou (2003), Wachsman (2006),
Candela, Figini, and Scorcu (2008), Candela and Figini (2010) and
Andergassen and Candela (2012, 2013). Within this framework, the
present paper argues that the TD has speciﬁc and distinctive fea-
tures which call for novel, original economic analysis.
In particular, the economic model for the TD developed herein
focuses on two speciﬁc aspects of the economics of tourism that, in
our opinion, are not properly addressed by existing literature, i.e.
the issue of coordination between local ﬁrms and the degree of
sophistication of the tourism product. In addressing them, we
extend and integrate theworks of Andergassen and Candela (2012),
who tackled the issue of sophistication, i.e. the supply of a variety of
different local goods and services that are also demanded and
purchased by tourists during their stay, and Candela et al. (2008)
and Candela and Figini (2010), who addressed the issue of price
coordination. Our approach follows Papatheodorou (2003), who
was the ﬁrst to formally analyze the issue of the complementarity
and variety of services within the tourism product, and Wachsman
(2006), the ﬁrst to formally analyze the problem of price coordi-
nation within the destination (see also Alvarez-Albelo &
Hernandez-Martin, 2009). The novelty of our paper is twofold.
Firstly, we generalize the problem of coordination, tackling the
main limitations in the results of Wachsman (2006) and Candela
et al. (2008). Secondly, we jointly consider sophistication and co-
ordination, thus building a unique economic model to describe the
development and the organizational pattern for the TD. Our
approach opens a new window through which to consider the
economics of the destination, thus highlighting important policy
implications for destination management and local stakeholders.
The economic model for the TD developed in this paper stems
from two intertwined perspectives, empirical and theoretical. From
the empirical perspective, our model aims at being consistent with
the anecdotal evidence of the great diversity of tourismdestinations
throughout the world, which differ in their history, resources,
organizational structure, institutional arrangement and specializa-
tion. In this respect, our model depicts different trajectories for the
TD, hence being able to overcome the deterministic logistic shape of
evolution described in the TALCmodel. Indeed, our set-up allows for
multiple equilibria. In the same way, we are able to explain the
reasons why some destinations can be locked into a certain stage of
development while others skip one or more stages completely. This
last problem is a key factor for potential destinations (particularly in
developing countries), inwhich tourismhasnot (yet) developed, but
is seen as an opportunity, often being considered a strategic path for
economic development by both policy makers and local stake-
holders. As we will highlight in the conclusion, our speculative
theoretical framework suggests future directions in empirical
research, e.g. testing whether the pattern of coordination and de-
gree of sophistication in the tourism product are signiﬁcant key
factors in explaining the path of development of a given destination.
From the theoretical perspective, the destination is a novel,
interesting object of study for economics. While some of the spe-
ciﬁc problems of the TD (the need to supply public goods and tackle
externalities) are standardmarket failures which usually call for the
intervention of the public sector (although Huybers & Bennett,
2003, show that the public intervention is not necessary if volun-
tary cooperation among local stakeholders for the management of
common resources occurs), there are two speciﬁc, distinctive
characteristics of the destination that are under-investigated and
are also marginal issues in the standard economic theory.
1. The tourism product supplied and sold by (or within) the
destination can be deﬁned as a bundle composed of a set of
elementary items. Such goods and services (accommodation,
transport, shopping, attractions, events) are demanded in a
complementary or substitutable way by tourists during their
holiday experience. While the concept of bundle is a standard
tool in economics (it is commonly used to build price indices to
be applied both in theory and national accounting), what is
new in tourism economics is its role as an object of study. The
deﬁnition of the product as a bundle of complementary and
substitutable goods opens up the issue of coordination and
cooperation among local ﬁrms supplying the individual com-
ponents of the holiday. In this paper, we focus mainly on the
complementarity feature, which is particularly relevant for
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holidays and allows us to deﬁne the tourism product as an
anticommon (Heller, 1998, 1999; Michelman, 1982). Accord-
ingly, the holiday can only take place if the ‘permission to stay’
is granted by all ﬁrms supplying complementary services to
tourists. Even if one ﬁrm only does not grant permission, the
tourism activity in the destination cannot take place. Stemming
from the anticommon nature of the tourism product, the
relevant questions to be addressed by an economic model for
the destination are: how can the anticommon problem be
tackled? Is there any role that can be played by the destination
management? What is the optimal pricing policy for the
tourism product as a whole? We will present and discuss our
model’s answers to these questions in Section 4.
2. The whole territory (intended as both its resources and orga-
nizational structure) enters the production function of the
holiday as an input. Hence, the destination can be analyzed as a
(meta) economic agent taking important decisions from the
supply-side at a level that is intermediate to the micro (ﬁrms
and tourists) and macro-levels (the whole economic system,
usually the country). The TD has sometimes been interpreted as
a type of cluster (Porter, 1998) since it shares some of the
characteristics of the industrial district although it cannot be
deﬁned as such (Candela & Figini, 2012; Michael, 2003). More
speciﬁcally, in the industrial district ﬁrms either produce sub-
stitute goods (horizontal cluster) or intermediate goods which
are then assembled (vertical cluster). On the contrary, in the TD,
ﬁrms mainly produce complementary services that are sold
directly to consumers. Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1997) call
this a diagonal cluster, a concept that ﬁnds a perfect application
in the TD and advocates what they call “co-opetition”, that is,
the co-existence of both competition and cooperation between
ﬁrms. At the same time, local resources represent the main
motivation for the trip, and therefore also enter the utility
function of tourists. Such a combination of an item that is both
an input of production and an argument of utility provides
another novel economic problem to consider. Moreover, most
of these resources are freely available (the landscape and the
offer of territory in general) and can be considered as common
goods (Hardin, 1968), while other resources can be developed
by the destination, e.g. an event or an amusement park. In this
respect, the relevant issues to be addressed by an economic
model for destinations are: what is the process leading to the
rise, the development, the specialization and the (environ-
mental and economic) sustainability of the TD? What are the
key-factors leading to the development of a tourism product
based on natural and/or cultural resources rather than an
institutional arrangement promoting a sophisticated tourism
product?Wewill present and discuss the answers of our model
to these questions in Section 5.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2
introduces and discusses the characteristics of the tourism desti-
nation, thus providing the intuition behind the model. Section 3
describes the structure and rationale of the model, its assumptions
andmain limitations. Section 4 focuses on the issue of coordination
and the optimal institutional set-up for the destination, while the
main results in terms of resource specialization, variety and so-
phistication of the tourism product are described in Section 5. Sec-
tion 6 discusses the main results and caveats of the model, thus
paving the way for future research, both theoretical and empirical.
2. The characteristics of the tourism destination
From the economics perspective, the TD does not necessarily
coincide with the destination management organization (DMO),
one of the possible institutional set-ups that may prevail, or with
the local policy maker. Instead, the destination can be seen as a
hypothetical (meta) agent, a territorial system with a speciﬁc
objective function to maximize and subject to given constraints. In
this respect, the economics of destinations studies the relationship
between demand (by different types of tourism hosted in the
destination) and supply (by themix of ﬁrms located in the territory)
for the entire tourism product. In general, a destination may offer
different types of holiday for different types of tourism, each
possibly characterized by a different mix of speciﬁc goods and
services, including the consumption of local resources, and ac-
commodation. Therefore, the tourism product is made up of all the
tourism destination speciﬁc and non-speciﬁc goods and services
that are demanded during one day of holiday; its quantity is
measured through the number of overnight stays and its value is
the daily price of the holiday. In the case of multi-tourism desti-
nations, the whole tourism product can thus be interpreted as the
weighted average of the many types of holiday offered in the
destination. Note that in the present context, where the demand
function is known with certainty, choosing the daily price (which
coincides with the weighted average price of the holiday) is
equivalent to choosing tourism expenditure, i.e. the aggregate price
of the holiday. It is well known that many conceptions of value
exist, being particularly relevant in tourism where many non-
market or semi-market goods (such as environmental and cul-
tural resources) are demanded and used. As is typical to the eco-
nomic approach, we only focus on the market value of the holiday,
as determined by its price, and we neglect any implication
regarding the social and cultural value of tourism in the destination.
Nevertheless, we indirectly capture the cultural and environmental
values of the resources of the destination through price and de-
mand effects, as in our model consumer demand changes with the
perception of environmental quality.
Contrary to what can be accomplished in applied research, in a
theoretical model we have to rely on strong assumptions, less
descriptive of the real-world complexity of destinations but able to
unfold the core of the economic problem faced by the TD. We start
by identifying two necessary conditions for the development of a
tourism destination, and one necessary condition for its long-term
sustainability (Andergassen & Candela, 2012).
Firstly, a generic point of interest, be it natural or artiﬁcial, must
exist in order for the destination to come into being. In order to
keep the model as simple as possible, while maintaining its
explanatory power, local tourism resources aremeasured through a
quantitative index R, which summarizes the overall endowment of
the destination (its natural, cultural and organizational resources,
the accessibility of its transport system, its infrastructures, etc.).
R depends on both exogenous (nature, history and culture) and
endogenous factors, such as the investment undertaken by the local
communitye public and private sectorse to adapt the endowment
in order for it to be included successfully in the tourism product,
and to preserve and enhance it by building amusement parks or
conference venues, by organizing events, etc. In short, any desti-
nation can be identiﬁed by its endowment of resources, the only
constraint being that R > 0. Given a certain quantity R, we call z its
quality as it is perceived by tourists. We assume that z depends
(non-positively) on the number of overnight stays, hence roughly
accounting for andmeasuring crowding and congestion effects. The
sign of the relationship between parameter z and overnight stays is
a matter of discussion, and we should also consider the different
case of a positive or, more generally, a non-linear relationship. In
this paper we assume that a threshold in the number of overnight
stays exists, after which the effects of congestion are at play.
Secondly, at least one variety of local goods has to be supplied
together with hospitality and the local resource, otherwise there is
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no reason to visit the destination. We measure the variety of the
tourism product through n, the number of differentiated tourism
goods and services that form the tourism bundle; each good/ser-
vice is represented by the index i ¼ 1, ., n. The straightforward
interpretation is that the higher the number n  1, the greater the
level of sophistication (the variety) of the tourism product. In the
limit case n ¼ 1 only the basic service needed to access the main
resource is provided in the destination.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there are only two
ﬁrms in the destination, one hospitality ﬁrm, supplying accom-
modation and the other one producing all the differentiated goods/
services. The assumption of just having one ﬁrm supplying all the
differentiated tourism goods/services greatly simpliﬁes the expo-
sition without altering the quality of the results (in footnote 2 we
discuss how results change if this assumption is relaxed).
We consider identical tourists endowed with a CES (Constant
Elasticity of Substitution) utility function, following a long strand of
literature on product differentiation which dates back to the sem-
inal paper by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and that has already been
applied to tourism by Papatheodorou (2003). Hence, from the point
of view of demand, the consumer has to decide how to allocate a
given income among a set of generic consumption goods (y) and a
tourism product (T), a bundle inwhich local resource R is measured
through its overall quality (z), hospitality (h) and a variety of goods
and services (xi).
Moreover, the supply of different varieties i of the local good xi
and the complementary hospitality service h need to coordinate
their quantity, quality and price, otherwise a suitable product able
to meet the tourism demand cannot be supplied. For the sake of
simplicity, we only consider coordination in price (assuming that
both coordination in quantity and in quality are already in place, see
Candela & Figini, 2010; Wachsman, 2006) between the only hos-
pitality ﬁrm in the destination and the ﬁrm supplying differenti-
ated tourism related goods and services.
However, the above-mentioned conditions are insufﬁcient to
guarantee the survival of the destination in the long-term. In fact,
long-term economic proﬁtability can only be achieved if the overall
tourism proﬁts of the destination, U, net of the costs K borne by the
destination for the investment undertaken to promote and foster
the local tourism sector, are at least as large as U*, which is an
exogenously deﬁned threshold that guarantees the long-term sur-
vival of the destination. This is the static equivalent of the dynamic
principle in which, in terms of endogenous growth theory, the
growth rate attained through specialization in the tourism activity
must be at least as large as the one that can be obtained if the
destination specializes in alternative activities (Lanza & Pigliaru,
1995, 2000). Concerning the market structure of the destination,
we assume that both ﬁrms are monopolists. This can stem from the
fact that the destination operates in a monopolistic competition
regime because of the peculiarity of its local endowment R thus
translating into the market power of its hospitality ﬁrm (sector)
and of the ﬁrm producing differentiated tourism goods xi, since
these goods are linked to the local resource and their characteristics
differ across varieties (Candela, Figini, & Scorcu, 2009). We
acknowledge that in reality many ﬁrms are aware of their market
power and therefore interact with each other strategically. Conse-
quently, although oligopolistic competition would be a more
appropriate setting for the analysis, we will leave this issue for
possible future research.
This modeling set up will allow us to identify the conditions
under which a region can successfully develop into a tourism
destination, either by following a policy of enhancing its resources
R, by directly or indirectly inﬂuencing the degree of sophistication
n, or by selecting the strategic coordination of prices (pi, i ¼ 1,., n
and ph) between the producer of local goods and the hospitality
sector. Thus, the implications for the tourism policy can be inves-
tigated, providing answers to the many (perhaps too many) hopes
of policy makers and local stakeholders who see tourism as the key
strategic sector for the economic take-off of their region. Two po-
sitions can thus be mentioned. For some (Raffestin, 1986), tourism
is like the Peano curve, a space-ﬁlling curve in the theory of fractals;
hence any territory can become a tourism destination. For others,
tourism development is only triggered by the existence of an
exogenous endowment and by the structure of preferences of the
consumers, regardless of the investment in resource enhancement,
in artiﬁcial endowment or in the variety of local goods. Without
such prerequisites and conditions on demand, the territory would
never be able to reach the threshold U* necessary to become a
sustainable tourism destination.
3. The model
In order to investigate the complex process leading to the rise
and development of the TD intuitively described in the previous
section, we will now develop a formal model. We represent the
problem as amulti-stage one, the decision tree of which is shown in
Fig. 1. Firstly, the local community has to decide whether to develop
a tourism destination or invest in other economic activities, the
former strategy being chosen if the net economic return to the
investment is at least as large as its opportunity cost, U  K  U*,
whereU* is the destination’s outside option. If this inequality holds,
the optimal amount of local resources (here intended as common
goods), hospitality and variety of the local goods is determined.
The following stage of the problem tackles the issue of whether
or not the tourism activity in the local territory should be coordi-
nated. In this phase, the equilibrium prices for goods and services
included in the tourism product (here intended as an anticommon)
are computed. The decision on whether or not to coordinate de-
pends on the sign ofUCUNC, whereUC andUNC are overall tourism
proﬁts of the destinationwith andwithout price coordination. In the
case of coordination, there are two possible solutions: coordination
provided by the destination management, in which total proﬁts are
UDM, and coordination provided by a tour operator, in which total
proﬁts are UTO (see Fig. 1). Moreover, from the perspective of the
destination it is also important to distinguish between local and
foreign tour operators as, in the latter case, the tour operator’s
proﬁts are exported and leave the local economy. Althoughweargue
that the solution with the local tour operator dominates the one
with a foreign tour operator in terms of total local proﬁts, this
strategy is not always feasible, particularly for developing countries.
Indeed, there may be a lack of the necessary professional skills and
competencies in many destinations or the local tour operator might
have higher production costs stemming from information asym-
metry or weaker economies of scale and of scope: hence it is rep-
resented as a dotted line in the decision tree in Fig. 1.
An important assumption of the model is that the production
costs of the two local ﬁrms are nil (taking positive average pro-
duction costs into account would not alter the qualitative features
but only complicate the exposition of our results) and consequently
tourism proﬁts coincide with revenues, and hence with the total
expenditure of tourists in the destination. This has an interesting
implication, since it allows us to reconcile the target of proﬁt
maximization (standard for economic theory) with that of maxi-
mization of tourism expenditure, the usual target for a local
tourism policy. Hence, the model can correctly describe the real-
world practice of looking at overall tourism expenditure as the
main indicator of tourism performance for the destination.
We ﬁrst describe the demand side of the model. Since overall
tourism proﬁts (U) are equal to tourism expenditure, which is
directly linked to the number of overnight stays, they, in turn,
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depend on the characteristics of the local tourism product. We
follow Papatheodorou (2003) and Andergassen and Candela (2012)
by assuming that tourists’ demand depends on: i) the availability of
natural and/or cultural resources (see also Melian-Gonzalez &
Garcia-Falcon, 2003); ii) the availability of a variety of local goods
and services, such as restaurants, recreational activities, wellness
and sport facilities, etc., that justify tourism in the destination,
beyond the enjoyment of the main resource. In this respect, we
assume that tourists show “a love for variety” in the tourism
product, as deﬁned by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
We consider a unit mass of identical tourists endowed with a
CES utility function having the following arguments: i) the length of
stay h of the holiday at the destination; ii) the variety of n  1
differentiated tourism related goods and services xi offered at the
destination, with i ¼ 1, 2, ., n; iii) the index measuring the
perceived quality z of the destination’s resource endowment R; iv)
the consumption of a non-tourism product y (which can also be
considered as the holiday in an alternative destination). The
tourism product is deﬁned by a bundle T including overnight stays
and the whole variety of local goods, T ¼ (h, {xi}).
If we namewith UT,j the sub-utility of the consumer j as a tourist
and with UY,j the sub-utility stemming from non-tourism con-
sumption, total utility for the agent is Uj ¼ U(y(j), z(j), h(j), xi(j)) and
can be written through the compound CES utility function (3)
(compound CES utility functions have been used within the
context of industrial organization and the economics of tourism by
Jiandong (2003) and Andergassen and Candela (2012, 2013),
respectively):
UT;j ¼ z
"
hgðjÞ þ
 Xn
i¼1
xai ðjÞ
!g
a
#1
g
(1)
UY;j ¼ yðjÞ (2)
Uj ¼
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1
b ¼
(
ybðjÞþzb
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!g
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#b
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b
(3)
In such a model, 0 < b < 1 implies that the non-tourism good y
and the tourism product T are gross substitutes (if b ¼ 1, the two
goods are perfect substitutes); g < 1 implies that overnight stays h
and the consumption of local goods xi are gross complements
(if g/N the two goods are perfect complements).We also assume
that b  a < 1, i.e. the degree of substitutability between tourism
product T and non-tourism product Y is not greater than the degree
of substitutability among local tourism goods and services xi.
Finally, z indicates the perceived quality of the tourism resource,
such as beaches, mountains and/or the cultural heritage of the
destination. The resource quality z has the O-ring property, that is,
it enters the utility function (1) as a multiplicative factor since
tourism exists if and only if z > 0.
The price of the non-tourism good is taken as a numeraire,
pyh 1, ph is the price of the overnight accommodation in the hotel,
pi is the price of the i-th variety of the local good. The budget
constraint of tourist j is hence:
yðjÞ þ phhðjÞ þ
Xn
i¼1
pixiðjÞ ¼ I (4)
where I is the tourist’s overall income, which is exogenous to our
analysis since tourists, by deﬁnition, are non-residents. The tourism
resource R, generally understood as the whole endowment of the
territory, is considered a public good of the destination and
therefore does not appear in the budget constraint (4) (see
Papatheodorou, 2003). However, this assumption does not hold if
the main resource of the destination is very speciﬁc and therefore
semi-private, such as an amusement park or a museum.
We assume that the perceived quality of the resource, z, de-
pends positively on its quantity R, zR > 0, but with non-increasing
returns, zRR  0, and non-positively on H, the total number of
overnight stays in the destination, since the level of satisfaction the
tourist gets from visiting the resource is inversely linked to the
crowding of the site, zH  0 with with zHH  0 and zHR  0. In
particular, we assume that z is a continuous function of H and that a
threshold H for aggregate overnight stays exists where zH ¼ 0 for H
 H and zH > 0 for H > H. With this assumption we aim to model
Tourism 
destination
Ω - K≥Ω* Coordination
No coordination
Destination
management
Tour
operator
Ω Overall profit for the tourism sector in the destination
Ω* Minimum acceptable threshold of profit for the destination
ΠTO profit exported by the foreign tour operator 
K cost of investment in resource enhancement or in sophistication 
of the tourism product
Foreign
Tour Operator
Local Tour
Operator
Ω = ΩNC
Ω = ΩDM
Ω = ΩTO
Ω = ΩTO − ΠTOΩ - K<Ω*
Other economic activity
Fig. 1. The decision tree of the tourism destination.
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the case where aggregate overnight stays reduce the quality of
tourism if they exceed the threshold H (we wish to thank an
anonymous referee for suggesting this functional form). Let the
elasticity of z with respect to H be:
ε
z
H ¼
vz
vH
H
z
 0;
where εzH ¼ 0 for H  H and εzH > 0 for H > H.
We ﬁrst derive the individual demand function for accommo-
dation and the differentiated goods and services, and then calculate
aggregate demand functions. Given the symmetry on the supply
side of tourism products xi (by assumption average production
costs of goods and services are all nil), we have that pi ¼ p for all
i ¼ 1, ., n. Since the mass of tourists is normalized to one, aggre-
gate demand functions H, Xi and Y are simply the sum of the
tourist’s individual demand functions h(j), xi(j) and y(j), for in-
dividuals j ∊ [0, 1]. More formally, H ¼
Z 1
0
hðjÞdj, Xi ¼
Z 1
0
xiðjÞdj
and Y ¼
Z 1
0
yðjÞdj, where H represents total overnight stays in the
destination, Xi total consumption of the complementary local good
i and Y total consumption of other goods. We consider parameter
values such that the price of overnight stays at the equilibrium is
greater than the price of differentiated tourism goods and services,
i.e. ph > p. Note that the individual tourist is small compared with
the overall mass of tourists in the destination and therefore takes
the perceived tourism quality as given when making decisions
about how to consume. At an aggregate level, an individual’s
choices feed back into tourism quality which, in turn, affects the
individual and aggregate consumption behavior. In other words, a
ﬁxed point problem has to be solved.
The following properties of aggregate demand functions can be
established.
Lemma 1. The aggregate demand function for overnight stays in the
destination is H*(n, R, p, ph), where H* is increasing in n, and R and
decreasing in ph and p; the aggregate demand function for the single
tourism good is X*(n, R, p, ph), where X* is decreasing in n, increasing
in R and decreasing in p and ph.
Proof. The proof can be found in the Appendix A.
Because of the complementarity between overnight stays and
tourism related goods and services, an increase in n leads to an
increase in the demand for overnight stays. On the other hand, an
increase in n reduces the demand of each single tourism good X*. By
fueling tourism quality, an increase in R increases the demand of
overnight stays H* and the demand of tourism goods X. Changes in
prices have the standard effect on demand: the law of demand
holds; assuming that the elasticity of zwith respect to H* is not too
large in absolute values, the complementarity between {xi} and h
implies that an increase in p (ph) decreases the demand for H*(X*).1
Given that production costs are nil, the proﬁts of the hospitality
sector are Ph(n, R, p, ph) ¼ phH*(n, R, p, ph) and those of the ﬁrm
producing the differentiated goods and services are nP(n, R, p, ph),
whereP(n, R, p, ph)¼ pX*(n, R, p, ph). Overall tourism proﬁts for the
destination are:
Uðn;R;p; phÞ ¼ nPðn;R;p; phÞ þPhðn;R; p; phÞ:
4. Coordination between ﬁrms in the destination and the
optimal pricing strategy
Like all multi-stage problems, the model has to be solved
backwards, and the equilibrium prices of the different coordination
alternatives (second stage of the problem) have to be determined in
order to obtain the optimal endowment of local resources and so-
phistication of the tourism product (solution of the ﬁrst stage
problem). In this section, we solve the second stage of the problem
by moving to the supply-side and assuming that ﬁrms and desti-
nations are price-makers. This last hypothesis is coherent with real-
world tourism markets, which are often non-competitive either
because ﬁrms have a monopoly or oligopoly position or, as is the
case for destinations, because of the high degree of differentiation
of the tourism product at a global level (Candela et al., 2009).
Hence, we investigate the characteristics of optimal pricing stra-
tegies for the TD for a given choice of n and R.
The daily price of the holiday in the destination, v:
v ¼ ph þ np
X*
H*
(5)
consists of the price for accommodation services and the price of
differentiated tourism goods/services multiplied by the quantity
demanded per day (nX*/H*). The equilibrium quantity for the
tourism product is identiﬁed by the number of days spent at the
destination (the number of overnight stays, H*). As already
mentioned, in this set-up tourism in the destination can be inter-
preted as ‘permission to stay’ granted by the ﬁrms supplying the
complementary services demanded by tourists while on holiday:
the tourism activity cannot take place if one of the two ﬁrms fails to
grant permission. For instance, tourism demand would be nil if
restaurants were unavailable in the destination, or if there was no
accommodation. The catchy idea regarding the existence of a
unique economic good, whose property is fragmented across
different ﬁrms, is known as “anticommon” and is not new in Eco-
nomics (see Heller, 1998, 1999; Michelman, 1982; Parisi, Depoorter,
& Schultz, 2000; Parisi, Schultz, & Depoorter, 2004) although the
concept has yet to be sufﬁciently exploited, particularly within the
ﬁeld of the economics of tourism where it nevertheless ﬁnds per-
fect application (Candela et al., 2008). Note that anticommon is the
exact opposite of the much better known “common”, a good which
is available to everyone but where property rights are not well-
deﬁned (Hardin, 1968).
In a general perspective, ﬁrms in the destination have to coor-
dinate in quality (in order to avoid a situation whereby tourists
staying in a luxury hotel can only ﬁnd take-away restaurants, for
example) and in quantity (to guarantee there is no rationing in any
of the services demanded). However, in this paper we have
neglected these issues and simply focused on price coordination.
We introduce three different cases: (a) no coordination, where each
ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts; (b) price coordination by means of
destination management and (c) coordination provided by a tour
operator supplying an all-inclusive holiday.
4.1. No coordination
Without coordination, ﬁrms solve independent maximization
problems. In particular the maximization problem for the hospi-
tality ﬁrm is maxphPh. The ﬁrst order condition for this problem is:
vPh
vph
¼ H* þ ph
vH*
vph
¼ 0 (6)
1 An increase in p unambiguously reduces H*. An increase in ph produces two
effects on X*. Firstly, because of the complementarity between {xi} and h, it has a
direct negative impact. Secondly, since it reduces H*, it increases tourism quality z,
thereby producing an indirect positive effect on X*. If jεzH j is not too large, then the
former effect dominates the latter. Formal proof of this result is available from the
authors upon request.
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The ﬁrm producing differentiated goods and services faces the
maximization problem maxpnP. The ﬁrst order condition for this
problem is:
vnP
vp
¼ nX* þ pn vX
*
vp
¼ 0 (7)
By considering the ﬁrst order conditions (6) and (7), and
assuming that second order conditions are satisﬁed, we obtain a
system whose solution is, if existing, a Nash equilibrium (see also
Wachsman, 2006) implicitly deﬁning the optimal values of ph and p:
ghðn;R; p; phÞ ¼ 0
gðn;R; p; phÞ ¼ 0 (8)
For each R and n, optimal prices for the destination can be
expressed as pNCh ¼ fNCh ðn;RÞ and p ¼ fNC(n,R), ﬁrm proﬁts are
PNCh ðn;RÞ and nPNC(n, R), and total tourism proﬁts for the desti-
nation are UNCðn;RÞ ¼ PNCh ðn;RÞ þ nPNCðn;RÞ.
4.2. Coordination provided by the destination management
This type of coordination, which is external to the market, takes
place if both the hotel and local ﬁrm support the role and back the
activity of a public authority, namely, the destination management.
We then assume that this local authority is able to coordinate the
local tourism sector through informational and promotional ac-
tivities and sell the tourism experience in the destination (local
goods and hospitality) as if it were an all-inclusive package.
Formally, the analytical problem becomes the maximization of
overall tourism proﬁts (tourism expenditure) in the destination:
maxp;phvH ¼ Uðn;R; p; phÞ
where y is the daily price of the holiday in the destination (5).
Assuming that the second order conditions are satisﬁed, the ﬁrst
order conditions for this problem are:
vU
vph
¼ Hþph
vH
vph
þnp vX
vph
¼ ghðn;R;p;phÞ þnp
vX
vph
¼ 0
vU
vp
¼ ph
vH
vp
þnXþnpvX
vp
¼ gðn;R;p;phÞ þph
vH
vp
¼ 0
(9)
from which we get for each R and n the optimal price for the
destination pDMh ¼ fhðn;RÞ and pDM ¼ f(n, R), ﬁrm proﬁts
PDMh ðn;RÞ and nPDM(n, R), and total tourism proﬁts
UDMðn;RÞ ¼ PDMh ðn;RÞ þ nPDMðn;RÞ.
The following Proposition holds by comparing systems (8) and
(9) and because of Lemma 1.
Proposition 1. pDMh < p
NC
h and p
DM < pNC and UDM > UNC.
Proof. The result follows from the second order conditions of
the problem and the comparison of systems (8) and (9). In partic-
ular, suppose that p ¼ pNC and ph ¼ pNCh , then from (9) and Lemma
1 vU=vph ¼ npðvX=vphÞ < 0 and vU=vp ¼ phðvH=vpÞ < 0; and
consequently, because of concavity of U, ph and p are too large.
The intuition behind this result is that when goods are com-
plements, their prices are too high when set individually, since
ﬁrms are unable to internalize the negative effects a price increase
has on the other ﬁrm’s demand and consequently its proﬁts.
Alternatively, the coordination of prices provided by the destina-
tion management makes it possible to set a more efﬁcient daily
price for the tourism product, thus leading to an increase in overall
tourism expenditure even though individual prices are lower.
However, proﬁts for one of the two ﬁrms may be lower when price
coordination is in place if the externality is strongly asymmetric, i.e.
the price of one good strongly affects demand for the other, but not
the other way around. For instance, consider the case where the
price of overnight stays has a strong negative impact on the de-
mand for differentiated tourism goods and services, and that the
effect of a change in the price of these latter on the demand of
overnight stays is negligible. In this case, the destination manage-
ment would internalize this negative externality and thus ﬁx a
lower price for overnight stays, while keeping the same price for
tourism goods. As a consequence, the proﬁts of the hospitality
service would be lower, those of the ﬁrm producing differentiated
tourism goods higher and overall tourism proﬁts would also be
higher compared with a situation in which there is no price coor-
dination. In this case, the destination management should also
redistribute proﬁts among its members. Note that Proposition 1
holds for a generic demand function as long as vX/vph < 0 and
vH/vp < 0 and second order conditions are satisﬁed.
4.3. Coordination provided by a tour operator
Coordination can also occur endogenously when the market
itself identiﬁes a new type of ﬁrm for managing the anticommon
problem. Such a ﬁrm, known as tour operator in business practice,
stipulates contracts with hotels and local ﬁrms by anticipating a
payment that covers themarket risk: the premium paid by ﬁrms for
this insurance activity is the discount granted on the full market
price (Castellani & Mussoni, 2007). The tour operator then pro-
motes and sells the services within an all-inclusive holiday package,
thus bearing the risk of no sale.
The contract is accepted by the hotel and the ﬁrm selling the
differentiated goods if, despite the discount, their proﬁts increase
(or at least do not decrease) compared with the case of no coor-
dination. Let us assume that the tour operator offers a free-sale
contract in order to buy services from local ﬁrms in which the
discounted price is ph  dh for the overnight stay and p  d for each
differentiated good, and where dh and d respectively, are the two
discounts (to be interpreted as the insurance premium). The eco-
nomic goal of the tour operator is to maximize its own proﬁts PTO
(again, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that average costs of
the tour operator are nil) subject to the participation constraint of
local ﬁrms: they accept the contract rather than selling directly on
the market if and only if their proﬁts are at least as large as the
proﬁts they make without coordination. Such an optimization
problem (for a different interpretation of the tour operator’s ac-
tivity in the coordination problem, see Alvarez-Albelo &
Hernandez-Martin, 2009), in a principal-agent setting is hence:
maxph;pP
TO ¼ phH þ npX  ðph  dhÞH  nðp dÞX (10)
s:t: ðph  dhÞH  PNCh and ðp dÞX  PNC (11)
(11) are the participation constraints, where PNCh and P
NC are
the ﬁrms’ proﬁts obtained in Section 4.1 and constitute their
outside options of not accepting the tour operator’s contract. If we
assume that the tour operator (the principal) offers local ﬁrms (the
agents) the minimum revenues of acceptance (transforming in-
equalities (11) into equalities, and thus determining d and dh) and
by replacing the binding participation constraints (11) into the tour
operator’s objective function (10) we obtain
maxp;phP
TO ¼ phH þ npX PNCh  nPNC (12)
It is easy to verify that the ﬁrst order conditions of (12) are the
same as those in (9) and thus optimal prices are ph ¼ pTOh and
p¼ pTO, which are identical to those of the destinationmanagement.
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4.4. Discussion
We can state the following theorem by comparing the solution
of no coordinationwith those in the case of exogenous coordination
through the destination management and endogenous coordina-
tion through the tour operator.
Theorem 1 (The Coordination Theorem). Given the anticommon
property of the tourism product, coordination among ﬁrms in the
destination, which can either be provided by the destination man-
agement or by a tour operator, increases proﬁts from tourism.
Hence, price coordination enables the tourism activity in the
destination to bemore efﬁcient.2 Note that this is an example of the
prisoner dilemma where (price) coordination yields a Pareto su-
perior solution to non-coordination.
In the case of coordination provided by the market as described
in Section 4.3, however, there is a distributional conﬂict between
the tour operator and local ﬁrms. Independently of the way in
which the distribution is solved (which depends on the bargaining
power of local ﬁrms, the tour operator and, in a more general
setting, on the number of tour operators competing for the desti-
nation, see Alvarez-Albelo & Hernandez-Martin, 2009), it is crucial
to assess whether or not the tour operator is a local or foreign ﬁrm.
In fact, if the tour operator is a local ﬁrm, total tourism proﬁts are
the same as is in the case of coordination by destination manage-
ment, although the distribution of the overall proﬁts among local
ﬁrms changes. More formally, total proﬁts in the presence of a tour
operator are UTO ¼ PTO þPNCh þ nPNC , and thus it is easy to see
that UTO ¼ UDM. On the contrary, if the tour operator is a foreign
ﬁrm, its proﬁts do not contribute to the destination’s income and
thus total tourism proﬁts of the destination areUTO ¼ PNCh þ nPNC ,
and thus UTO ¼ UNC < UDM, the difference UDM  UNC being the
surplus generated by price coordination and thus forming the tour
operator’s proﬁts. It is then possible to state a corollary of the Co-
ordination Theorem by focusing on the distributional consequences
of endogenous coordination.
Corollary 1. When coordination is provided by a foreign tour oper-
ator, local proﬁts are lower than in the case of coordination provided
by the destination management. The type of coordination chosen in
the destination, therefore, is not neutral with respect to the distribu-
tion of proﬁts.
Clearly, the solution of a local tour operator dominates that of
a foreign one (since in the former case the tour operator’s proﬁts
remain in the local economy), but it is fundamental to remember
that this corollary stems from the assumption of identical cost
structures for both tour operators, and thus may not hold in a
more general setting. It is likely that for many destinations,
particularly those in developing countries, the local tour oper-
ator might lack the skills or the market conditions to produce at
such a (low) cost. To simplify this exposition, in the remaining
part of the paper we focus solely on the case of a local tour
operator.
5. The optimal level of sophistication of the tourism product
in the destination
In this section, we move on to the ﬁrst stage problemwhere the
TD has to ﬁnd the optimal pattern of development given the price
solutions for the coordination problem deﬁned in Section 4. We
argue that, following a long-run strategy of development, the local
policy maker can engage in investments that enrich the destina-
tion’s natural as well as cultural resource endowments R. Moreover,
we argue that it can directly or indirectly control the degree of
sophistication of the tourism product n. This is done, for example,
through either granting licenses to open shops or other business
activities or, in a more microfounded model, by taxing or subsi-
dizing the set up cost for single production/commercial facilities. In
a fully-ﬂedged model, one should ﬁrst calculate the optimal private
degree of product differentiation followed by the optimal social
one, and then ﬁnd the optimal policy intervention such that the
private one coincides with the social one (however, this is beyond
the scope of the paper). More formally, the TD faces the following
maximization problem
maxn;RU

n;R; pC ;pCh

 Kðn;RÞ (13)
s:t: U K  U* (14)
where K(n, R) are the policy maker’s cost of enforcing a degree of
sophistication n and endowing the destination with resources R,
where vK/vn > 0, vK/vR > 0, v2K/vn2 > 0 and v2K/vR2 > 0. A change
in n and R affects tourism proﬁts directly and indirectly through a
change in p and ph. Since the solution of the second stage is either
exogenous or endogenous price coordination with equilibrium
prices ðpC ¼ pTO ¼ pDM ; pCh ¼ pTOh ¼ pDMh Þ, the indirect effect is of
second order and can thus be neglected because of the envelope
theorem. Formally, the total derivative of tourism proﬁts with
respect to n is:
dU
dn
¼ vU
vn
þ vU
vpC
vpC
vn
þ vU
vpCh
vpCh
vn
(15)
where the ﬁrst term is the direct effect of n on U and the last two
terms are the indirect effects through pC and pCh , respectively.
Because of the ﬁrst order condition (9) the indirect effects are
negligible, i.e. vU/vpC ¼ 0 and vU/vphC ¼ 0, and thus only the direct
effect matters, i.e. dU/dn ¼ vU/vn. The case of a change in R gives
symmetric results. Finally, (14) is a sustainable development
constraint requiring that tourism proﬁts must be sufﬁciently large
as to guarantee the survival of the destination over time.
Before characterizing the solution to problem (13), we describe
the analytical properties of U, which is a special case of the results
in Andergassen and Candela (2012).
Proposition 2. (a) U is increasing in R. (b) U is decreasing in the
degree of tourism sophistication n if εzHlg > 1 and is increasing if
ε
z
Hlg < 1, where lghg=ð1 gÞ˛ð1;0Þ.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
An increase in the destination’s resource endowment increases
the demand for overnight stays as well as the one for tourism
related goods and services and thus overall tourism proﬁts increase.
Differently, an increase in the degree of sophistication of the
tourism product has an ambiguous effect on tourism proﬁts,
depending on the degree of complementarity between overnight
stays and tourism goods as well as on the elasticity of tourism
quality with respect to the size of the tourism activity. To
2 If we assume that differentiated tourism goods and services are supplied by
more than one ﬁrm, each with some market power, then in addition to the problem
that stems from the complementarity between accommodation and differentiated
tourism goods described above, there is an additional problem stemming from the
substitutability between the individual differentiated goods/services, where it is
well known that ﬁrms charge less than socially optimal prices. In this case, ﬁrms do
not internalize the positive external effect that a price increase produces on the
demand for another product. Thus, by considering together the complementarity
and the substitutability problem, a more general coordination theorem still holds
where both exogenously or endogenously negative (due to the complementarity)
and positive (due to the substitutability) externalities are internalized.
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understand the intuition behind this result we have to disentangle
the effects of the two opposing forces that are at play, namely, a
love for variety and a tourism depreciation effects. If overnight stays
and tourism goods are independent (that is, for lg/ 0), then an
increase in n does not affect overnight stays H. Consequently, the
tourism quality does not decrease and thus the only effect is that
tourists spend more in a given destination owing to their love for
variety. Hence, tourism proﬁts increase. In a similar vein, proﬁts
increase unambiguously if overnight stays and tourism goods are
complements, where an increase in n increases overnight stays H,
and the perceived tourism quality does not decrease as H increases
(i.e. for H  H where zH ¼ 0). On the other hand, if zH < 0 (that is, if
H > H), then an increase in H reduces tourism quality, thereby
reducing tourists’ expenditure on the overall tourism product. If the
reduction in tourism quality is sufﬁciently strong (that is,
jεzH j > 1=jlgj) then this latter effect more than offsets the love for
variety effect and thus overall tourism expenditure, that is, overall
tourism proﬁts, decrease. On the other hand, if the reduction in
tourism quality is sufﬁciently weak (that is, jεzHj < 1=jlgj), then an
increase in the degree of sophistication increases tourism proﬁts.
Assuming that parameters are such that for some values of n,
Un > 0 (if on the contrary Un < 0 for all n  1, then tourism
development through sophistication is not viable) the marginal
rate of substitution between R and n provides a theoretical answer
to the question about the conditions driving the creation of a
tourism destination, its development pattern and its sustainability.
In fact, the optimal degree of investment in specialization (through
enhancement of resources or sophistication) of the tourism desti-
nation is given by the maximization of tourism proﬁts. The ﬁrst
order conditions of the maximization problem (13) are:
vU
vR
¼ vK
vR
and
vU
vn
¼ vK
vn
and describe the optimal policy mix of the destination, determined
with respect to the relative marginal gain (the marginal rate of
substitution between R and n is MRSR;n ¼ UR=Un) and to the
relative marginal costs of local investments in R and n
ðMRSR;n ¼ KR=KnÞ, respectively. Moreover, by means of technical
progress, the elasticity εzH affecting the properties of U described in
Proposition 2 might change. The interpretation would be that the
tourism sector is moving away from being a low technology sector,
thus increasing its options of preserving, restoring and requalifying
its resources.
If the negative tourism quality effect always dominates the
positive love for variety effect (i.e. εzHlg > 1 for each n  1 and
R > 0), then development of the destination through tourism so-
phistication is not feasible and can thus only occur through
resource investments. Investment in resources may pave the way
for tourism sophistication to become a viable development strategy
if it alleviates the negative tourism quality effect (formally, if
v 3zHnvR < 0) and thus the destination can twin resource in-
vestments with tourism sophistication to foster tourism activity.
The different solutions make it possible to recognize different
organizational and development patterns for real-world destina-
tions. For example, if we narrow the analysis down to beach
tourism in Italy, there are destinations with limited resources but a
highly sophisticated tourism product, like Rimini for example;
destinations with extraordinary natural resources and no sophis-
tication at all, with local supply limited to hospitality such as some
coastal areas of Sardinia; there are destinations with signiﬁcant
natural resources and a certain degree of variety of local products
like the Costa Smeralda. This has important theoretical and political
implications as, according to the TALC model, these three different
types of destination are at different stages of their evolution, while
in the presentmodel they are different optimal equilibria stemming
from alternative endowments of resources and specialization
patterns.
Moreover, to complete the description of the solution to prob-
lem (13), we need to discuss the relevance of the sustainable
development constraint (14): U(n*, R*)  K(n*, R*)  U*. If this
condition holds we can afﬁrm that tourism development is viable
and sustainable. If instead U(n*, R*)  K(n*, R*) < U*, then tourism
proﬁts are below the minimum threshold and the solution for a
territory willing to become a destination is not economically viable.
From a policy perspective, the implication of this section of the
model is that destination management can trigger tourism devel-
opment in two ways: either by investing in the enhancement,
preservation and improvement of existing resources, or by sup-
porting an increase in the variety of local tourism goods and ser-
vices, i.e. what is known as the ‘degree of sophistication of the
tourism product’. While the former strategy is usually bound by the
exogenous endowment of historical sites, cultural heritage and
natural environment, the latter can be implemented through the
interaction between the private and the public sectors and has the
advantage of fueling forward and backward linkages among
tourism ﬁrms and between tourism ﬁrms and other sectors. Lastly,
it is remarkable to note how the increase in the degree of sophis-
tication of the tourism product has a double effect on total
expenditure: on the one hand, it positively affects proﬁts through
an increase in the total number of overnight stays; on the other, it
negatively affects it through a perceived worsening of quality due
to the effects of congestion and crowding. As a particular case, if the
development level of a destination is such that it does not bear
congestion effects, i.e. H < H where εzH ¼ 0, or if this effect is very
small, i.e. jεzHj < 1=jlgj, these properties deﬁne a “Love for Variety
Theorem” for the destination, allowing tourism to “take-off” in the
long run. Variety in the tourism product can then be a strategic
asset.
Theorem 2 (Love for Variety Theorem). As long as the negative
externalities on tourism quality are small, reorganization of the
tourism destination toward increasing the variety of available goods
and services raises tourists’ welfare and their willingness to spend on
tourism at the expense of non-tourism consumption, thereby stimu-
lating the economic development of the destination.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed an economic model for the
tourism destination by focusing on two speciﬁc aspects that, in our
opinion, cannot be studied properly with the standard toolbox of
micro andmacroeconomic theories and for which the destination is
an interesting object of study from the economics perspective: i)
the tourism product can be deﬁned as a bundle composed of a set of
elementary items. Such goods and services (accommodation,
transport, shopping, attractions, events, etc.) are mainly demanded
in a relationship of complementarity by the tourist during the
holiday experience; ii) the territory (its endowment of resources
and its organizational structure) is argument of both production
and utility functions, and hence the destination can be analyzed as
a (meta) economic agent taking important decisions from the
supply side at an intermediate level to the micro (ﬁrms and tour-
ists) and macro-levels (the country’s entire economy). Two key
issues have been identiﬁed in order to understand the rise,
specialization, development and institutional arrangement of
tourism destinations. These are i) the choice between investing in
the variety of the tourism product (its sophistication) or enhancing
local resources; ii) the coordination of local ﬁrms, stemming from
the anticommon property of the tourism product.
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These problems have been jointly analyzed and tackled in this
paper for the ﬁrst time, building on a recent strand of literature
(Andergassen & Candela, 2012, 2013; Candela & Figini, 2010;
Candela et al., 2008; Huybers & Bennett, 2003; Papatheodorou,
2003; Wachsman, 2006). Our theoretical set up allows us to
state: i) a ‘Love for Variety Theorem’ which depicts alternative
development trajectories allowing the destination to reach its
economic goal: from investing in enhancing resources to the pro-
cess of increasing the sophistication of the tourism product; ii) a
‘Coordination Theorem’, from which different institutional set-ups
can be identiﬁed, ranging from local destination management to
the coordination provided by the tour operator.
It is important to highlight that, since in the real-world each
destination has different cultural, natural and socio-economic
characteristics, and since stakeholders are often called upon to
make decisions within a framework of bounded and limited ra-
tionality, the model presented in this paper does not aim to reduce
‘ad unicum’ and propose a unique and converging model of desti-
nation development and management. On the contrary, we wish to
provide a theoretical basis for the plurality of real-world solutions:
in this sense, we believe that our model has more explanatory
power than the TALC model. Indeed, as far as coordination is con-
cerned, we can identify:
* ‘Individually based destinations’, in which there is no coordina-
tion between local ﬁrms operating in the tourism sector. Given
our assumption of no organizational costs, or equivalently iden-
tical organizational costs, this solution is always dominated by
(endogenous or exogenous) coordination. However, as we argue
later in this section, this may not always be the case;
* ‘Community managed destinations’, in which local ﬁrms are co-
ordinated by a local authority: the destination management (that
can be a public body, an association of local ﬁrms, or an out-
sourced destination management organization e DMO);
* ‘Corporate based destinations’, in which coordination is provided
by a tour operator (and where it is important to distinguish
whether the tour operator is local or foreign).
As far as tourism sophistication is concerned, we can identify:
* ‘Resource based destinations’, where the tourism product is
based on local resources (either natural, cultural or artiﬁcial),
with a very limited variety of differentiated goods;
* ‘Sophistication based destinations’, where local resources are
very limited but the tourism product is based on a large variety of
local goods and services;
* ‘Mixed based destinations’, where there is a balance between
local resources and a certain degree of sophistication of the
tourism product.
Overall, since the economic problem of the destination is
identiﬁed in our model by two dimensions (sophistication and
coordination) and sincewe list three classes for each dimension, we
are theoretically able to propose a taxonomy of destinations in (at
least) nine classes, to which we have to add:
* ‘Non-tourism destinations’, regions inwhich investing in tourism
is neither economically viable nor convenient.
We believe that our model is a ﬁrst step in jointly analyzing the
two fundamental features of tourism destinations (sophistication
and coordination) which were recently introduced in literature,
and in providing a new perspective for tourism economics. We are
aware of the many limitations of the model, stemming, in partic-
ular, from some over-simplifying assumptions that make applying
it to real-world policy planning difﬁcult. However, the model is
already sufﬁciently intricate in the present setting, and relaxation
of some assumptions might excessively complicate its solution, at
least at the present state of the art.
In this respect, the main limitation is that the model is a partial
equilibrium one, since the destination is analyzed in isolation. The
most important extension would therefore be to move toward a
general equilibrium framework with inter-destination competition
(by considering at least two competing destinations). A second
important extension would be to introduce a multi-destination
player into such a general setting like, for example, an interna-
tional hotel chain which is a monopolist in the sector and owns
hotels in all destinations. This is exactly what Wachsman (2006)
does in a simpliﬁed model of coordination with linear demand. It
would then be very interesting to check the robustness of his re-
sults (that the advantages of intra-destination coordination tend to
disappear when competition between destinations is introduced
and when a monopolistic multi-player appears in both destina-
tions) in our more general framework. Similarly, an open question
would be to see what happens if coordination is provided by the
same tour operator in both destinations.
Future research should also relax some other, more technical
assumptions. Firstly, accounting explicitly for production and co-
ordination costs, which may reverse the result that price coordi-
nation is optimal and might affect in a non-trivial way investment
and development strategies in the ﬁrst stage of the game. In fact, if
one takes organizational costs into account then no-coordination
may become the optimal institutional set-up, provided that the
relative organizational costs of exogenous and endogenous coor-
dination are sufﬁciently large. Secondly, by assuming that differ-
entiated tourism related goods and services are produced by more
than one ﬁrm with some market power, that is, abandoning the
assumption of monopolistic competition and framing the model in
the context of oligopolistic competition, one could explicitly study
the more general price coordination problem where complemen-
tarity and substitutability, the core elements of the tourism prod-
uct, coexist. Thirdly, real-world destinations often differ with
respect to the preferences of tourists to crowding. Hence the pre-
sent assumption of tourists being crowding-averse, which is
tantamount to assuming that a snob-effect is at work, has to be
extended to the alternative assumption of mass tourism, where a
band-wagon effect would be at work instead. In this respect, Swann
(2010) might be an interesting approach to follow in a dynamic
perspective. Fourthly, another extension would be to transform the
multiple-stage problem into a simultaneous equilibrium in which
both prices and types of investment are jointly determined. Lastly,
dynamics could be introduced explicitly in themodel, to investigate
the evolution of the destination and optimal policy intervention
over time. This, and other related issues, are left for further theo-
retical research.
On a different perspective, there are many interesting questions
that the model’s set-up and its conclusions leave open to empirical
research. Firstly, there is the issue of measuring sophistication and
price coordination. Concerning sophistication, both the number of
tourism businesses and their degree of diversiﬁcation should be
taken into account. At the same time, a fundamental issue regards
how to estimate the importance of local resources, both in terms of
quantity R and quality z. Concerning coordination, a careful mea-
sure should be able to distinguish between the different types of
organizational patterns. Secondly, what are the factors determining
the pattern of sophistication and coordination chosen by the
destination? Is the empirical evidence coherent with our theoret-
ical model? Thirdly, is the economic performance of the tourism
destination and its evolution over time correlated with the degree
of sophistication of its tourism product and with the type of
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coordination prevailing among ﬁrms? The answer to this question
is crucial in determining the validity of the model, in which the
absence of catching up and of a converging model of development
for tourism destinations is a key result. While the huge body of
literature in destination management can provide us with the state
of the art on how to approach these empirical issues, we leave these
questions open for future research.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. Since there is a continuum of tourists, each
one has a negligible effect on tourism quality z. Using Lagrange to
solve the problem of maximizing (3) under the budget constraint
(4), the ﬁrst order conditions for the representative consumer read
as follows:
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for i ¼ 1, ., n, where l is the Lagrange multiplier. Using the
assumption that all ﬁrms producing tourism related goods are
symmetric we have pi ¼ p and hence obtain xi¼ x, for each i ¼ 1,.,
n. From (17) and (18) we obtain:
x ¼ h

p
ph
n1
g
a
 1
g1
(19)
while from (17) and (16) we obtain ph ¼

zb

hg þ ngaxg
b
g1
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.
yb1 which, using (19), reads as:
y ¼ hðphÞ
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For the following it is convenient to express parameters charac-
terizing the consumer’s preferences in (1)e(3) using the deﬁnitions
lbhb=ð1 bÞ˛ð0;NÞ; lghg=ð1 gÞ˛ð1;0Þ; lahð1 aÞ=a˛ð0;NÞ:
We calculate h by substituting (19) and (20) in the budget
constraint (4) and obtain:
hðn;zÞ¼ I
ph

1þnlgla

p
ph
lg
1þplbh zlb

1þnlgla

p
ph
lglblg	
(21)
where hn > 0. Substituting (21) back into (19) and (20) one obtains:
xðn; zÞ ¼ I
p

nlgla

p
ph
lg
þ 1

1
nþ plbh zlb
2664nlglb þ nlglalglb pph
lg3775
lb
lg
ð22Þ
and,
yðn; zÞ ¼ I 1
1þ plbh zlb

1þ nlgla

p
ph
lglblg : (23)
Since all tourists are identical, h(j) ¼ h and x(j) ¼ x, and conse-
quently H ¼ h and since pi ¼ p it follows that Xi ¼ X ¼ x. Next we
calculate the aggregate demand function H(n, R), where the tour-
ists’ aggregate choice H feeds back into tourism quality z. Using
(21), we have to solve the following ﬁxed point problem:
which yields the solution bH ¼ Hðn;R; p; phÞ. In view of
the assumption about z, fHðph; p;n; zðbH;RÞÞ  0, with f(ph, p, n,
z(0, R)) > 0 and a unique H+ solving f ðph; p;n; zðbH;RÞÞ ¼ bH
exists.
Applying the implicit function theorem one obtains
vH+=vn ¼ fn=ð1 fHÞ > 0 and vH+=vR ¼ fR=ð1 fHÞ > 0; respec-
tively. After rearranging terms one obtains:
H ¼ f ðph;p;n; zðH;RÞÞ h
I
ph

1þ nlgla

p
ph
lg
1þ plbh zlb

1þ nlgla

p
ph
lglblg	 (24)
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and,
Next consider the price effects. Observe that fH < 0, fp < 0 and
that:
fph ¼ 
H+2
I

1þ lb þ


1þ lg

nlgla

p
ph
lg
1þ plbh zlb
1þ nlgla

p
ph
lglblg	 lb	< 0 ð27Þ
Applying the implicit function theorem to (24) we obtain
dH=dph ¼ fph=ð1 fHÞ < 0 and dH=dph ¼ fp=ð1 fHÞ < 0.
By increasing z, an increase in R increases X. Since b < a it fol-
lows that lalb < 1 and thus an increase in n directly reduces X.
Moreover, an increase in n increases H and thus reduces z, thereby
indirectly reducing X.
Consider the price effects on X. It is easy to see that the direct
effect of p and ph on X is negative. But since an increase in p or ph
reduces H, by increasing z, it increases X. It can be shown that as
long as jεzH j is not too large, the former effect dominates the latter
and thus an increase in p or ph reduces X.
Proof of Proposition 2. Proof of part (a) of the Proposition is in
the text. Part (b). The derivative of the denominator of U with
respect to n is:
plbh lbzlb
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
p
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lg
After substituting the expression for vH+=vn in the ﬁrst line of
the derivative and rearranging terms we obtain:
Using the equilibrium expression for H+ (24) the derivative of U
with respect to n can be written as:
UnðR;nÞ ¼U
2
I
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lb
h z
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which establishes the result.
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